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Not so Fragmented: The Party System in the Last Parliamentary Election of Imperial Austria

The 1911 election to the Imperial Diet of Imperial Austria (the Austrian part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) was the last parliamentary election of the country, and the second election with universal franchise of male citizens. A large number of parties competed, many of which existed in only one or few of the crown-lands, and the outcome was a variegated assembly of parties of diverse political orientation and ethnic character. Within the Diet, the situation became somewhat clearer because the majority of members joined parliamentary groups, most of which included several parties.

This short article does not discuss all aspects of this election. We analyse neither the voter turnout nor the successes of single parties in the election. We rather focus on the heterogeneity of the party landscape and on political fragmentation on the national, regional, and local levels. We discuss in which sense the system was fragmented, in what respect it may be considered rather homogenous, and where we can observe regional differences.¹

I. THE ELECTION REGULATIONS

The 1911 election was held according to the respective regulations of 1907.² The Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Imperial Diet (this was the official name of the country) were divided into electoral districts within which the voters enjoyed equal voting rights; thus, there were no voting classes any more. All male citizens from 24 years of age were entitled to vote, except professional military, persons under tutelage, people on public welfare, bankrupts, and certain criminals.³

There were 516 members of parliament and 480 electoral districts. The 36 rural electoral districts of Galicia elected two members each, whereas the 36 urban vot-

* *Abbreviations*: RGBL: Reichsgesetzblatt.

1 The data come from BUREAU DER K. K. STATISTISCHEN ZENTRAKKOMMISSION (Bearb.), *Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911* (= Österreichische Statistik, Neue Folge 7/1), Wien 1912.

2 RGBL 15/1907; RGBL 17/1907.

3 § 7, RGBL 15/1907; § 7–8, RGBL 17/1907.

ing districts in Galicia, and all of the remaining 410 voting districts in other lands, elected one member each. In the single member districts, a candidate was elected on the first ballot if he received more than half of the vote. If no candidate made it on the first ballot, a run-off election between the two most successful candidates followed. In the Galician double districts, the first member was elected if he received more than half of the vote; the second member had to receive more than a quarter of the total. If there was no such result, either a complete second ballot or a run-off election between two or three candidates followed, depending on the outcome of the first ballot. Since the first ballot shows voters' preferences more precisely than the run-off elections, we use only the results of the first ballot in this article.

Apart from the Galician particularities, the election regulations provided also for a special election order in Moravia. The whole of this crown-land was divided into electoral districts twice, once into thirty electoral districts for Czech speaking voters, and once into nineteen electoral districts for German speaking voters. There was no such division in mixed language areas of the other crown-lands.

Throughout the country, there was a division between urban and rural electoral districts. Middle-sized cities like Klagenfurt, Trento, or Liberec formed one complete voting district each, larger cities were divided into several voting districts. Vienna had 33 electoral districts, Prague and Lwów/Lviv had 7 each, Kraków/Cracow had 5. Smaller cities and market towns were combined into electoral districts, although they lay quite far apart from each other in some cases. For instance, the 3rd electoral district in the Duchy of Salzburg consisted of 26 major places scattered across the whole crown-land. Altogether, there were 196 urban electoral districts. The remaining rural communities formed 320 voting districts with contiguous territory, mostly mergers of several judicial districts with or without cities, sometimes also with fractions of judicial districts added (judicial districts were subdivisions of political districts, the main administrative units of the lands).⁴ In terms of voters' numbers, rural electoral districts were about one and a half times the size of urban voting districts. However, both categories display a large spread between 2,200 and 22,800 voters in urban voting districts, and between 3,700 and 30,000 voters in rural voting districts (here, we use only half the actual numbers in the Galician double districts).

Normally, the whole area of an electoral district lay within one crown-land. As an exception, the so-called Moravian enclaves in Silesia (the judicial districts of Hengersdorf and Hotzenplotz, and a few additional communities) formed part of Moravian voting districts.

4 The appendix of the election law provides a detailed description: Anhang zur Reichsratswahlordnung, RGBl 17/1907.

Due to these principles of demarcation, electoral districts only rarely (mostly in cases of single cities) were identical with political districts or judicial districts. Only in a small number of cases electoral districts are exactly identical with a combination of several judicial districts, that is, in cases where no cities or market towns of that area were combined into an urban electoral district. Altogether, the demarcation of voting districts is unfavourable to an analysis of the election results because many of the data that can be used in such an exercise, such as the sectoral structure, the age distribution, and others, are normally available only for political districts and judicial districts. For the voting districts, the election statistics provide data on language groups, with some minor additions to be gathered from the 1910 census statistics.

Apart from the documentation of election results in the voting districts, a separate section of the election statistics also shows the distribution of votes in political districts and judicial districts. Results for political districts almost always are an amalgamation of votes from various electoral districts, be it urban or rural ones. This information is certainly not irrelevant given that votes are listed by parties involved. But there is still good reason to assume that from the beginning the candidacy was predetermined by the structure of voting districts. Had there been, for instance, no division into urban and rural electoral districts, that is, had cities and market towns been part of the same electoral districts as the surrounding rural communities, conditions for candidates would have been quite different.

2. CANDIDATES, PARTIES, *Klubs*

Almost all elected members of the Diet were affiliated to parties, and the election statistics display results by parties, not by names of candidates. Some parties existed in several crown-lands, but altogether the party constellations varied considerably from land to land, and there was a large number of parties. One of the reasons for this inflation of numbers of parties was the habit of organising parties by ethnicity, that is, in this context, by language communities. Hence, we must distinguish between German, Czech, Italian, Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, Polish, Ukrainian, and Romanian parties and candidates. In addition, we find one elected Jewish-Nationalistic member and several Zionist candidates. These ethnically defined parties were either Christian Social, social democratic, or liberal and nationalistic in various shades.

In the Diet, the members were divided into parliamentary groups (*Klubs*) which were organised according to both ethnic criteria and political orientation.⁵ For instance, the German Christian Socials formed their own *Klub*, while their Italian coun-

⁵ For the parties in the Imperial Diet, see LOTHAR HÖBELT, *Parteien und Fraktionen im cisleithanischen Reichsrat*, in: Helmut Rumpler – Peter Urbanitsch (Hg.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*

terpart, the Italian People's Party, was part of the *Unio Latina*, a *Klub* that included also the Italian liberals and two Romanian parties. Similarly, the Moravian Catholic National Party joined the Unified Bohemian *Klub*, an umbrella association of mostly Czech *Klubs* of nationalists and liberals, but also Ukrainian russophiles.⁶ The Polish Christian Socials, on the other hand, were part of the Polish *Klub*, where most Polish members participated, except the Polish Social Democrats.⁷ The Slovenian counterpart, the All-Slovenian People's Party, which operated under different names in the crown-lands concerned (Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia and Gradisca), formed a Croatian-Slovenian *Klub* together with the Slavic Nationalists of Istria, and the Croatian Party of Law, which was based in Dalmatia. The other Dalmatian members, in turn, were organised in their own Dalmatian *Klub*.⁸

Another national *Klub* was the Ukrainian League of Ukrainian National Democrats and Radicals from Galicia, and the Young Ruthenians from Bukovina. The most important ethnically defined *Klub* was the German National League, the largest of all parliamentary groups, with a hundred members.

The Social Democrats generally did not belong to politically integrative ethnic *Klubs*. The Italian Social Democrats kept away from the *Unio Latina*, and sat in on the German Social Democratic *Klub*, as did the Ukrainian Social Democrats. The Czech Autonomistic Social Democrats formed their own *Klub*, which did not take part in the Unified Bohemian *Klub*, just as the Polish Social Democrats, who were not part of the Polish *Klub*. The Czech Centralistic Social Democrats, on the other hand, were part of the Polish Social Democratic *Klub*, too.

Confusing as the scene might seem if assessed in its entirety, from the perspective of voters, the decisions were much easier, as parties and candidates faced always a limited number of competitors in the respective voting district. Within the Christian Social camp, Germans and Slovenes confronted each other only in one lower Styrian and four Carinthian voting districts (in all cases none of them stood a chance). In

(= Verfassung und Parlamentarismus. Verfassungsrecht, Verfassungswirklichkeit, zentrale Repräsentativkörperschaften, 7/1), Wien 2000, 895–1006, hier 975–996.

6 For the Ukrainian parties, see KLAUS BACHMANN, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Rußland. Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Rußland (1907–1914)*, Wien 2001, 138–159, 196–201. HARALD BINDER, *Galizien in Wien. Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im Übergang zur Massenpolitik* (= Studien zur Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie, 29), Wien 2005.

7 For the Polish parties, see KRZYSZTOF DUNIN-WĄSOWICZ, *Die sozialen und politischen Bewegungen der polnischen Bauern in Galizien am Ende des 19. und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*, in: Karlheinz Mack (Hg.), *Galizien um die Jahrhundertwende. Politische, soziale und kulturelle Verbindungen mit Österreich*, Wien 1990, 50–67; BINDER, *Galizien in Wien*.

8 For the parties in Dalmatia, see JOHANNES KALWODA, *Parteien, Politik und Staatsgewalt in Dalmatien (1900–1918). Zur Wechselwirkung zwischen staatlicher Verwaltung und parlamentarischer Vertretung*, Diss. Universität Wien 2017.

some Viennese districts, both candidates of the Christian Social Party and independent Christian Social candidates competed. In one such case the independent Alois Heilingner won, a former Christian Social Party politician, who defeated Leopold Kunschak, the official and rather weak party candidate; in the other cases, Social Democrats won. The Italian People's Party, the Czech Christian Socials, and the Moravian Catholic Nationals, nowhere faced another Christian Social Party.

A competition between Social Democrats ensued only in the Bohemian lands. The Czech Autonomistic Social Democrats faced German Social Democrats in three Bohemian electoral districts, the Polish Social Democrats in one Silesian electoral district, and the Czech Centralistic Social Democrats in major parts of Czech Moravia and some Bohemian and Silesian voting districts. There was no such competition among social democratic parties elsewhere.

While Christian Socials and Social Democrats appeared mostly unified in the respective electoral districts, nationalistic and liberal parties showed a higher propensity toward competition among themselves. Within the spectrum of German liberal parties, we find the proverbial heterogeneity with ever new transformations, party splits and party fusions, which resulted in frequent changes in the general appearance of this part of the political landscape.⁹ Similar processes can be observed among Polish, Ukrainian, and Romanian parties.

3. A MEASURE OF FRAGMENTATION

The total heterogeneity or total fragmentation f_t of the party landscape can be calculated using the following index formula:

$$f_t = \frac{(V_t^2 - \sum_{n=1}^N P_n^2)}{V_t \cdot (V_t - 1)} \quad (1)$$

where V_t is the total number of valid votes, and P_1 to P_n are the votes for party 1 to party n .

This calculation has the following implications:

- If there is only one party, which consequently takes all valid votes, there is no fragmentation, and f_t is 0.
- If every voter votes for a different party, and consequently there are as many parties as voters, and each party receives exactly one vote, fragmentation reaches the maximum, and f_t is 1.

⁹ LOTHAR HÖBELT, *Kornblume und Kaiseradler. Die deutschfreibeitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs 1882–1918*, Wien–München 1993.

- If the denominator were V_t^2 instead of $(V_t \cdot (V_t - 1))$, an equal distribution of the votes among n parties would result in an f_i of $(1-1/n)$. That is, in an equal distribution among two parties (50 per cent each), the index value would be 0.50. In an equal distribution among three parties (with a third of the vote each), f_i would be 0.67, in an equal distribution among four parties, it would be 0.75, and so on. Since there are at most as many parties as voters, f_i would be smaller than 1 even in the case of maximal heterogeneity.
- In electoral districts the size of the Austrian districts in 1911 (1,500 to 50,000 voters, with a mean of 9,500 voters) the difference between a denominator of $(V_t \cdot (V_t - 1))$ and a denominator of V_t^2 is immaterial. The results differ only in the third to fifth decimal place.
- For some districts, the election statistic summarises votes for several candidates in one number under headings like “fragmented votes” (or similar). In principle, these votes should be attributed precisely to the different candidates. However, the numbers are so small that they do not change the overall picture.

Generally, a major number of parties (n) tends to result in a larger degree of fragmentation, and generally fragmentation decreases, the more dominant one party becomes. The minimal value of f_i in every party constellation tends toward 0, but never arrives at 0 (except settings with only one party). The minimal value appears when all parties except the dominant party obtain just one vote each, and the dominant party obtains the rest.

When the votes are distributed among a certain number of parties perfectly equally, f_i is larger than in an unequal distribution among the same number of parties. This maximum value f_{max} for n parties with equal share of the vote is defined as

$$f_{max} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \cdot \frac{V_t}{V_t - 1} \quad (2)$$

For the maximum value of f_i in a system with n parties with unequal shares of the vote, a similar principle applies. Here, f_{max} is attained when the votes that are not cast for the dominant party are distributed equally among the remaining parties. This value is defined as

$$f_{max} = \frac{n - nr_d^2 + 2r_d - 2}{n - 1} \cdot \frac{V_t}{V_t - 1} \quad (3)$$

where r_d is the share of votes obtained by the dominant party.

Figure 1 (a) and (b) displays a graphical expression of heterogeneity in two examples. Example (a) shows the distribution of votes among two parties of equal size ($f_i = 0.50$), example (b) shows a distribution among parties of different size ($f_i = 0.68$). The shares of the parties, plotted on either the horizontal or the vertical axis, are




Fig. 1: Calculation of the measure of fragmentation.

squared, and are visible as dark squares. Due to squaring, the remaining lighter area, which is the graphical expression of f_i , becomes larger the more parties are present, and the more equal the votes are distributed among them.

By analogy, heterogeneity can be calculated for other categorical variables, for instance, for the shares of language groups. The same principles apply, that is, heterogeneity is 0 when everyone speaks the same language, and it is 1 when everyone speaks a different language.

The index can be calculated not only for the overall result of an election (f_t), but also for parts of the political spectrum, for instance, for the fragmentation within a political camp. For that purpose, we add up the votes obtained by the parties that belong to that camp. By analogy with formula (1), the fragmentation within the political camp f_c is calculated as

$$f_c = \frac{(V_c^2 - \sum_{n=1}^N c_n^2)}{V_c \cdot (V_c - 1)} \quad (4)$$

where V_c is the number of the combined votes obtained by the parties that belong to the political camp, and C_1 bis C_n are the votes of camp party 1 to camp party n .

Since the index formula is a simple addition, the index value can easily be disaggregated. An obvious question would be how the overall heterogeneity can be divided into a heterogeneity *between* political camps f_i and a heterogeneity *within* political camps. Again, by analogy with formula (1), the fragmentation *between* political camps f_t is calculated as

$$f_t = \frac{(V_t^2 - \sum_{n=1}^N V_{cn}^2)}{V_t \cdot (V_t - 1)} \quad (5)$$

where V_{c1} to V_{cn} are the votes for political camp 1 to political camp n as used in formula (4). The fragmentation *within* the political camps must then be weighted by the share of the respective camp because a large fragmented camp contributes more to overall fragmentation than a small camp be it even as fragmented in itself. Then we get:

$$f_t = f_i + \sum_{n=1}^N (f_{cn} \cdot r_{cn}^2) \quad (6)$$

where f_{c1} to f_{cn} are the values of fragmentation within the political camps 1 to n calculated using formula (4). r_{c1} to r_{cn} are the vote shares of camps 1 to n . Figure 1 (c) provides a graphical illustration.

Clearly, the result depends on the definition of camps. In principle, both extremes are possible, that is, a camp may comprise all parties ($f_i = 0$), or, each party forms a separate camp ($f_i = f_j$). For the definition of political camps, the competition between

parties is no criterion, because there are parties which do not compete (above all, due to different regional bases) although they belong to different camps, and there are parties of the same camp that compete with each other.

Again, by analogy, the overall heterogeneity can be divided into a heterogeneity *within* ethnic groups and a heterogeneity *between* ethnic groups.

For a sensible and useful classification of the 1911 election results by fragmentation and heterogeneity, we must consider what values of f will appear in typical constellations. For instance, a system with only two parties, and an equal vote share of both parties, results in a f_t of 0.5. Such a value cannot be regarded as an indicator of a larger degree of political fragmentation because a party system that consists of just two equally strong parties is not fragmented in any sense.

In a two-party system, 0.5 is the maximum value of f . The value of f diminishes, the more unequal the vote shares of the two parties become. If the proportion is 1:2 (33 per cent for one party, 67 per cent for the other), f is 0.44; if the proportion is 1:4 (20 per cent for one party, 80 per cent for the other), f is 0.32; if the proportion is 1:19 (5 per cent for one party, 95 per cent for the other), f is 0.1. That is, small parties remain visible.

A f of 0.5 can appear not only in a two-party system, but also in systems with any number of parties. For instance, in a ten-party system, the maximum value of fragmentation f_{max} is 0.5 if the dominant party obtains a vote share r_d of 0.7 (70 per cent) (the result changes only minimally with varying V_t).¹⁰ This means, with the use of f as a measure of fragmentation, a system with two equally strong parties counts as equally fragmented as a ten-party system where the largest party gets 70 per cent of the vote, and each other party gets 3.3 per cent.

In other words, f informs about the number of competing parties only to a limited degree. A low f indicates a strong dominance of one party but does not inform about the number of parties. A large f suggests, due to formula (2) and formula (3), that there is a larger number of parties, of which no one dominates extremely.

Thus, for the classification of f values in the maps, we distinguish between the following types:

- one class includes areas with a pronounced dominance of one party and hence a f smaller than 0.40;
- one class includes areas without fragmentation, be it a system with a small number of parties with balanced vote shares, or be it a system with a larger number of parties where one party clearly dominates, hence a f between 0.40 and 0.50;

¹⁰ The calculation follows formula (3) transformed as follows:

$$r_d = \frac{1}{n} + \sqrt{\frac{1}{n^2} + 1 - f_{max} \frac{V_t - 1}{V_t} \cdot \frac{n-1}{n} - \frac{2}{n}}$$

- we then distinguish between four classes of areas with stepwise increasing fragmentation, with a f of 0.50–0.55, 0.55–0.60 and so forth;
- the final class includes areas with extreme fragmentation, and a f larger than 0.70.
- In the outcome of the 1911 election, the different classes comprise between 67 and 82 electoral districts, except the uppermost class (highest fragmentation) with 40 electoral districts.


4. RESULTS

Adding up the votes for all parties in all crown-lands, and calculating the heterogeneity on the national level on that basis, yields a f of 0.95. This extremely large value is due to the inclusion of each and every party in the estimate, even parties that are present only locally.

A distinction by local conditions leads to a much lower degree of heterogeneity. The fragmentation was lowest in the southernmost electoral district of Dalmatia and the whole country (Cattaro) where the Serbian Party gained more than 99 per cent of the vote, which yields a f of 0.01. The highest degree of fragmentation appears in a rural electoral district in the westernmost part of Galicia (Myślenice and Saybusch) where candidates of seven Polish parties, an independent Polish candidate, and various other candidates contested the two seats. Here none of the candidates had a dominant position, and f consequently is 0.87. Map 1 displays f for all electoral districts, that is, for Moravia in separate maps of the Czech and the German voting districts, and for Galicia in one single map of the double districts. In addition, some major cities appear enlarged.

The map shows the effect of two factors immediately. The first factor is urbanisation: urban voting districts, in the map small units within the larger rural areas, stand out against their surroundings, mostly as darker dots, which means, they are more fragmented. The exception of the rule is Galicia where urban electoral districts tend to display a lower degree of fragmentation than the surrounding rural voting districts. The other factor is the effect of regional conditions. Vorarlberg, large parts of the Tyrol, parts of Upper and Lower Austria, Eastern Styria, and Bukovina show a lesser degree of fragmentation, whereas Bohemia, Moravia (both Czech and German Moravia), and East Galicia seem much more heterogenous.

As pointed out above, f can be disaggregated in order to determine how the observed fragmentation is due to a fragmentation *between* political camps, and a fragmentation *within* political camps. For a definition of political camps in the period between the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and World War I, we might consider the following criteria:



Map 1: Fragmentation in the electoral districts, 1911.


- the relation to the Catholic Church regarding political programs, the role of the clergy in politics, and the loyalty toward the Catholic Church as such;
- the social base of the electorate, that is, the occupation by sectors and branches, the hierarchical position within a branch, and the income of the main target groups;
- the position in constitutional matters and ethnic policy, in particular regarding the relation between Hungary and Imperial Austria, rights of ethnic groups in ethnically mixed areas, the autonomy of certain areas within the country, a separation of certain areas from the country, and a unification of certain areas with other countries.

These criteria work in varied ways, that is, parties that differ from each other in certain respects may resemble each other in other respects. Thus, the result is a more or less usable compromise. In the case of the 1911 party system, a consistent Christian Social camp can be accepted due to the efficacy of political Catholicism and the large vote share of the respective parties. Another, equally plausible camp is Social Democracy. In both cases, the camps can be defined as reaching across ethnicities, considering that within them there was little ethnic competition.

The situation becomes more complex regarding parties for which ethnicity and relating constitutional matters played a decisive role. Given that these parties pursued opposed aims, depending on ethnic affiliation, it does not make sense to assign them to one single camp. Thus, they are treated separately by ethnicity.

The heterogeneity by political camps (Map 2) resembles the patterns of political fragmentation as a whole: in those areas where total heterogeneity is high, the heterogeneity between political camps is also high. This means, conversely, that the defined camps display a large degree of homogeneity, and that within electoral districts there was little competition within political camps (this is not displayed in maps). We find an exception in West Galicia where competition occurred mainly within political camps (in this case, among Polish parties) and where the fragmentation between camps is correspondingly low; in other words, the defined political camps cover West Galician conditions badly.

The distinction *between* ethnicities and *within* ethnicities points to the same direction (Map 3). The fragmentation between ethnically defined parties is generally very weak, f stays mostly under 0.1 here. The remainder then refers to the fragmentation within ethnicities, that is, between parties belonging to the respective ethnic group. Clearly, this does not concern nationalistic parties only, but all parties of a camp. For instance, the fragmentation within the German ethnicity is calculated as the fragmentation between German Christian Socials, German Social Democrats, various German liberal parties, and so on. The calculation for other ethnic groups follows the same principles. We find one exception to this far-reaching homogeneity of ethnicities in East Galicia, where Polish and Ukrainian parties competed in a number of



Map 2: Fragmentation between political camps, 1911.



Map 3: Fragmentation between ethnicities, 1911.

electoral districts (in addition, there were often several Ukrainian parties competing in this area).

A further point to be addressed is the heterogeneity within the German liberal camp. The idea of a pronounced fragmentation in this part of the political spectrum is a constant in the literature on Austrian liberalism, but actually such a fragmentation is a regional matter rather than a universal phenomenon (not displayed in the maps). Areas that behave in this sense were parts of Bohemia (a major part of the district of the Cheb/Eger Chamber of Commerce, parts of the Liberec Chamber of Commerce), southern Moravia, and a few scattered electoral districts in the Alpine lands. In the major parts of the Alpine lands and Moravia, and in the rest of Bohemia, the fragmentation of the German liberal camp is weak. A certain caveat, however, comes from the urban voting districts, where the heterogeneity in this segment is usually more pronounced than in the surrounding areas. This is a relevant point, given that the German liberal parties were clearly stronger in cities, with a vote share about double their share in the countryside; the urban prevalence in the liberal camp was similar to the corresponding results of the social democrats.

5. SUMMARY

Even the simple analysis presented here yields a clear picture. Competition between political parties in Imperial Austria a few years before the start of World War I meant a competition between political camps, that is, between Christian Socials, Social Democrats, and various nationalistic and liberal parties. This competition happened mostly within the respective ethnicity.

In contrast, the competition between ethnicities became relevant only rarely, apart from some scattered cases only in major parts of Eastern Galicia. In all other areas, including almost all areas with mixed ethnicity, this factor was unimportant.

Within the political camps we see relatively little competition. Christian Social parties appeared well coordinated and almost never ran against each other. Within social democracy, competition on a larger scale occurred only in the Czech voting districts of Moravia. Even within the German liberal camp the competition between parties was restricted to a few areas. Compared with other ethnicities (Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Romanians), the German liberal parties are no exception in this respect.